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Historians and political 
scientists share ‘politics’ 
as a research object, with 
both academic disciplines 
complementing each other. 
However, in the public 
debate and in policy advice, 
historians are less visible. In 
the media, the political debate 
that takes place in The Hague 
and certainly in Brussels is 
increasingly reduced to a power game and the call 
for more participation and control by citizens. 
Historians have provided added value in the 
matter-of-fact analysis of the always-controversial 
electoral tightrope, other forms of participation 
and advocacy, policymaking, institutions and 
political strategy. Historical research offers insight 
into the shifts in this balance (as well as their 
causes and/or motives) instead of simple solutions 
or pointing to democratic deficits. Comparisons 
with other countries and analyses of policies and 
their implementation as the result and goal of 
politics deserve greater attention, both in academia 
and in the public debate.
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introduction
- “You dare call that ‘science’?! What you’re doing is just storytelling! No theory, 
just wordy speculation!” [the political scientist exclaimed]
- “How dare you! Reducing everything to a handful of arbitrary, ‘quantifiable’ cri-
teria to suit your ‘theory’ … Is this the kind of ‘knowledge’ we really need?” [the 
political historian shouted back]
What I’ve re-enacted for you here is the precise moment that an “interdisciplinary” 
conference devolved right back into a “multidisciplinary” gathering. The falling out of 
two esteemed colleagues took me by surprise; I was taken aback by the sheer crudeness 
of the altercation. And yet, classical stereotypes so often determine the course of com-
munication between historians and political scientists. These colleagues felt slightly 
uncomfortable because of the raised voices; they were not at all uncomfortable with 
the “arguments” employed. Most conference participants were indeed in agreement 
that political science and history as disciplines are better kept apart.
And so the first of the three “gaps” that I would like to address in my lecture today is 
this schism, between political science and political history. Political scientists and his-
torians share three interests: politics (or decision making), policies (those decisions’ 
implementation) and polities (the organised societies in which all this takes place). 
But at most universities their “political studies” are carried out in different schools – the 
social sciences and the humanities, respectively. Academics largely ignore their col-
leagues on the other side of campus, and only reluctantly make use of each other’s 
concepts and results.
Meanwhile, open-minded reflections on the compatibility and complementarity of the 
two disciplines are few and far between. Most are contrastive: theory versus narrative, 
quantitative versus qualitative, prescriptive versus descriptive, etc. One reflection on 
the gap between political history and political science that I found employs an elegant 
metaphor that likens history to Machiavelli and political science to Hobbes.1 Hobbes 
was determined to identify structural patterns in politics as the basis for predictions, 
whereas Machiavelli acknowledged the mercurial character of politics that favours ex-
perience over inflexible rules or lessons. This same paper goes on to argue that the size 
of the gap between the two disciplines has varied over time. Historians have not changed 
course much, but in political science the strong belief in quantification and determi-
nism has gone in and out of fashion; in moments of strong belief, in the early 20th 
century or in the fifties, for instance, its distance from history grew. But if we see the 
discrepancies between nomothetic political science, which seeks to uncover the laws of 
political behaviour, and idiosyncratic history, committed to fully understanding a uni-
que case, as basically fundamental, these variations in distance are ultimately irrele-
vant.  
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Arguably, comparative politics long ago toned down its scientific ambitions. Middle-
range theories have replaced grand, universal ones. Since the eighties, neo-
institutionalism and the unwritten rules of the political game have brought “bounded 
rationalities” to the table. Further, political scientists have discarded the mechanical, 
ahistorical concepts of “path dependency” and “historical legacy.” In historical 
institutionalism, “critical junctions” identify episodes of crisis and we accept that their 
outcomes may be either system consolidation or radical change. 
Giving up on determinism makes political scientists much more sympathetic to 
historians, who shy away from predictions of any kind, even when they concern the 
past. Political scientists have also introduced “process tracing” as part of their 
qualitative toolbox which, unlike the determinism of causation, allows for variation 
and uncertainty in causal effect. Some naïve historians have argued that this technique 
– of tracing ideas, factors and agents – is nothing more than a version with a fancy 
name of what historians have been doing for centuries. And they’re absolutely right!   
For this lecture, I will identify two lessons for historians from political science and vice 
versa. I use two published books of mine and two new projects to make my case: an ol-
der book on the building of state institutions in the Balkans and a brand new textbook 
on the history of European integration. One work in progress is a book on the role of 
peasant parties in eastern Europe in the late 19th and the first half of the 20th century. 
The other is a book on two centuries of nature conservation and environmentalism in 
the Netherlands. I am fully aware of the commitment inherent in what I just said in 
that last sentence; the director of research is sitting right behind me, taking mental 
notes.         
lessons for the political scientist
The two issues where political scientists may take a note from historians concern con-
textualisation and historiography. Contextualisation refers to embedding ideas and 
institutions in a broader frame of societal and political development, as every political 
thinker and actor is shaped by his time. From the historian’s perspective, absolutely 
nothing should escape the rigors of contextualisation, including the historian himself. 
Political scientists, conversely, use universal definitions as a rubric, uniform and im-
pervious to time, in which to compare political systems and policies. To them, context 
is a distraction to be minimised rather than focused upon. If there is an essential gap 
between the two disciplines, it is not the absence of theory in history, but rather the 
epistemological status of theory “above history” for political scientists. For a historian, 
“theories” are but the works of other academics that have “aged well.”
In our recent textbook on the history of European integration, each chapter, which are 
ordered chronologically, includes a section on the dominant integration theory of that 
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particular decade; neo-functionalism in the fifties, constructivism in the nineties, etc. 
Political science textbooks have offered much more sophisticated and elaborate over-
views of theory building. But these overviews fail to contextualise the theorists, with 
the possible exception of the link between Jean Monnet’s functionalist strategy and 
Ernst Haas’s neo-functionalist theory. And tying theories to political realities can help 
students tremendously in understanding where these ideas came from.2
Where a political scientist applauds timeless and “well-defined concepts,” a historian 
may discern an anachronistic and thus normative use of concepts. For instance, politi-
cal scientists studying European democracy and Europe’s democratic deficit invariably 
take 1979, the year of the first direct elections to the European Parliament, as their 
starting point. In doing so they ignore highly relevant pre-existing forms of citizen par-
ticipation and interest representation on the European level as well as the dynamics of 
representative claims by European institutions.3 Anachronism may constitute a serious 
methodological flaw, but may also turn out to be productive. Driven by today’s surge in 
referendums and ever-closer civic control over politicians, historians have revisited the 
early stages of European integration. Some have done so merely with the aim of proving 
that the European project has been undemocratic from the start. Others have revealed 
new insights into ideals and practices of representation, despite the anachronistic ori-
gins of the research question.
On to the second lesson for the political scientist. To my mind (and I know many of my 
colleagues will fiercely disagree), the true mastery of the historian lies in historiograp-
hy, that is, his command of the work of other historians. A historian takes his clues 
from the most recent celebrated studies in his field, but also from academic texts that 
are twenty or fifty years old or from partisan contemporaries. Thus, the distinction 
between primary sources from archives and secondary literature from libraries is lar-
gely fictitious. The transition from contemporary and eyewitness to hindsight, from 
political involvement to academic distance, is a gradual one. Political science is defined 
by the quintessential gap between abstract theories and empirical data, but the histo-
rian’s toolbox is far more versatile in research design thanks to this continuum, from 
primary sources to academic literature and theory. 
For political scientists (and for many undergraduates in history) historiography, the 
coming to terms with this overwhelming and disorganised pile of old and new books, 
multilingual articles and untraceable papers, is a genuine ordeal. For the hard-pressed 
political scientist testing a theory for a dozen countries or more, the writings of histo-
rians – the result of countless hours sifting through and verifying information from 
archives, newspapers, websites, etc. – constitutes an indispensable source. For his study 
to be based on more than quantitative data sets, he has simply to rely on the ground-
work laid by historians. Of course, history is not the objective mirror image of past re-
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alities and historians hold different views. Therefore, the political scientist will always 
be able to find a historian who neatly fits his theory. But how to ascertain that this 
historian is not a historiographic “outlier”? The most reliable view of history is not the 
mean average of all available opinions in the field.4 Finding one’s bearings in historio-
graphy is indeed an art. 
My current book project, for instance, is based on a critical review of historiography and 
no archival or other fieldwork. It will integrate the history of nature conservation in 
the Netherlands since the 19th century with the interwar utopian projects of land recla-
mation in the former Zuiderzee and the environmental activism of the seventies. The 
study links Jac. P. Thijsse to the rewilding of the Oostvaardersplassen. It also compares 
Staatsbosbeheer and the Ministry of the Environment to developments in neighbou-
ring countries. Why? Simply because existing histories tend to carefully separate these 
narratives. Partisan literature on the social movement against nuclear power and indu-
strial pollution in favour of sustainability and biodiversity since the early 1970s has all 
but eclipsed the story of older conservationist activism and environmental policies by 
national governments and intergovernmental organisations.
lessons for the political historian
Our first lesson for historians concerns public relevance. Historians often envy politi-
cal science for its high-profile presence in the public debate. To my mind, however, his-
torians have only themselves to blame for neglecting two topics of public and political 
relevance and visibility: European integration and policy studies.
I recently asked an audience of more than a hundred political historians: which among 
them would consider him or herself a “dedicated historian” of European integration. 
Only a handful came forward. For political scientists, European integration is a recog-
nised field of study, on par with comparative politics, international relations and poli-
tical theory. In history, European integration hovers between national history and di-
plomatic history. From the beginning, historians have been reluctant to embrace 
European integration as a research topic. For decades they could blame the lack of ac-
cess to primary sources for neglecting the evolution of the Paris and Rome treaties. 
Today, however, the source problem has been turned on its head: too many member 
states, too many archives and too many languages. The academic literature on politics, 
polities and policies of the European Union is expanding exponentially, but the histo-
rians’ share remains disproportionately small.5 One of the primary reasons for these 
reservations amongst historians is certainly a preference for high politics, representa-
tive institutions and political ideas over low politics, multi-layered governance and the 
dissemination and implementation of policies. In this way, European integration is 
closely linked to the historian’s second neglected topic, policy fields, as Brussels is all 
about processes and policy fields, governance rather than politics.
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The second lesson for historians rests on the undeniable fact that political scientists 
pay far more attention to comparative research design: MSSD/MDSD, representativen-
ess, variables, hypotheses, etc. Here, before I continue, an apology is in order. Years ago, 
I participated in a German seminar for PhD students in history. One presented his 
project, a comparison of six cities in four different countries. His conclusions boiled 
down to the reassuring confirmation that each of these cities has a history all its own 
and that they were thus incomparable. Only differences stood out in his descriptions. I 
asked, somewhat naïvely, what exactly was the added value of the comparative ap-
proach for his project. He gave me a rather condescending smile and said: “Well, of 
course, comparison identifies similarities and differences.” I responded with a cold 
stare and said nothing. „Transnationaler Forschungsansatz“ … „komparative Gegenü-
berstellung“ … „Verflechtungsgeschichte,“ he ploughed on, if less smugly. „Es tut mir 
leid, Karlheinz, es tut mir wirklich leid!“ The lesson here is that comparison is not a 
virtue in and of itself. A comparison of case studies with the vague aim of finding “si-
milarities and differences” will yield mostly differences. Only accepting a degree of re-
ductionism in the process and never minding the gaps between cases will reveal generic 
patterns if any are to be found. Ideally, the case studies ought to be secondary to the 
variable driving the comparison – an institution, an aspect or a policy dilemma. Such a 
“tertium comparationis” is conducive to “bold” and open-ended comparisons, looking 
for the generic rather than the unique.6
Still, even a poorly designed comparison is better than no comparison at all. Let me give 
you a deterrent example. At the end of the 19th century, each east European country 
witnessed the rise of one or more peasant parties, some of them radical-anarchist, 
others conservative, others liberal. A long-term favourite project of mine is comparing 
the intellectual roots, political organisation and repertoires of the modern peasant par-
ties in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland in the interwar period. For each of 
these parties a modern institutional history and biographies of key figures have already 
been written. But the possibility of transnational comparison, even one based on histo-
riography, has not crossed the mind of most historians. One study did collect portray-
als of several dozen peasant parties, but its ambition was little more than what German 
academics respectfully call a Buchbindersynthese.7 It explained why no viable peasant 
parties had emerged in Western Europe, but had little to say on generic patterns among 
the national peasant parties in the East. 
Crossing the border, and looking for transfers and comparisons with neighbouring 
West European countries is but one step, and it is a relatively modest one. It is an un-
fortunate state of affairs that comparative transnational studies rarely traverse the old 
Iron Curtain, even three decades after the end of the Cold War. This East-West divide in 
post-war European history may seem a no-brainer as far as polities and politics are 
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concerned. As for policies, however, comparisons may yield numerous insights – some 
of them complementary, others iconoclastic. In policy fields related to structural pro-
cesses of modernisation, contrast in political systems is not an excuse to not try com-
parisons, with post-1989 hindsight.
The post-material environmentalism of the seventies is one of these iconoclastic East-
West comparisons. Common wisdom has it that the rise of environmental activism in 
Western democracies came out of a new affluent post-war generation.8 Political histo-
rians and political scientists were quick to embrace these youth protests and the idea-
lism of new social movements as essential parts of Western democracy. In the fifties, 
however, local public outcry prompted reluctant authorities and companies to remedy 
the worst threats to public health from factory pollution near residential areas: in Rot-
terdam, but also in Bitterfeld in the GDR. More importantly, broader environmentalist 
movements in the West in the seventies had counterparts in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet republics in the eighties. Post-material ideals were remarkably similar and, on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain, environmentalism was a vehicle for anti-establishment 
mobilisation.9 In sum, the claim of the unique phenomenon of Western democracy 
needs qualification.
In some cases, questions of methodological principle have prevented historians from 
designing and implementing comparative studies. Around the turn of the last century, 
a rather tense debate erupted on the compatibility of comparative and transnational or 
transfer approaches. Among French, and in particular among German historians, the 
dispute has been all about methodological dogma and fundamental flaws. True enou-
gh, a comparison of case studies in the natural sciences presupposes that the agents 
involved in one case are unaware of and isolated from agents in the others. But in poli-
tical studies and the humanities, this precondition is obviously never met. French and 
German experts in modern history have spent most of the last decade in a protracted 
debate on the relative merits and (in)compatibility of transfer and comparison. And yet 
political scientists and Anglo-Saxon historians have ignored these almost philosophi-
cal qualms and blissfully experimented in combining comparative and transfer approa-
ches.10
A decade ago, I was fortunate to be part of such an experiment. Each author in our team 
had the daunting task of using a combination of transfers and comparisons to discern 
patterns in a policy field or political institution as it emerged in the Balkans in its tran-
sition from Ottoman and Habsburg rule to independent statehood around 1900. Topics 
included systems of local administration, taxation, church-state relations, media, or-
ganized violence and citizenship.11 Even today, I am not aware of many such transnatio-
nal studies in Western Europe, integrating up to five countries. Of course, such a de-
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manding experiment takes its toll: The quotes with which I opened this lecture were 
taken from feuding collaborators on the very same project!     
the way forward: policy fields
Where do we go from here? Political history certainly has an image problem, unlike 
political science or cultural history. It has absorbed all the “turns” that have come its 
way, be they cultural, visual, post-colonial, spatial or performative. And yet, the repu-
tation of the old-fashioned discipline dedicated to high politics persists. Well aware of 
this predicament, political historians have recently revisited E.H. Carr’s century-old 
question: “What is political history (now)?”12 Most attempts to define it end up iden-
tifying topics or aspects that are not political history. It seems to me that both in the 
academic and in the public debate, the position that the social does not end where the 
political begins is far more productive.
Over the past two decades, the cultural turn has been the main innovation in political 
history. The cultures and conventions of key representative institutions have been stu-
died and institutional biographies written, compellingly making the case that political 
culture is much more than just the façade of power politics.13 And this has effectively 
eclipsed the study of classic statecraft politics and old institutionalism. In one respect, 
however, the cultural turn is both revolution and restoration. As a renowned Bielefeld 
historian recently admitted, despite all these innovations, “governments, monarchs, 
parties, or parliaments, and the activities directed towards influencing these agents 
(…), still get the bulk of attention in many new political histories”.14 The study of poli-
tical culture is typically focused on one specific high-political institution and is often 
non-comparative. Thus, it implicitly reconfirms the perceived gap between society and 
high politics. Now, the cultural turn will have to prove its added value in concrete stu-
dies focussing on a policy field or variable instead of an institutional case.  
Today, students of political institutions and high politics find themselves crowded out 
of a highly polarised public debate and are regarded with suspicion, both as academics 
and as “system” apologists. Conversely, the study of policy fields examines the realities 
of government-citizen interactions, channels of participation and interest articulati-
on. Such low-politics examples may indeed get the message across that there is no di-
chotomy of political versus civil society. More importantly, unlike grand treatises on 
democracy and political legitimacy, policy studies reveal the practical realities of citizen 
participation and forms of representation beyond the key democratic institutions. 
Speech acts and political deed by all actors are “read” against the grain, looking for 
unspoken and un-reflected notions of citizen-politics relations.15 
12 prof.  dr.  wim van meurs
Its diachronic analyses of both ideas and practice are relevant for today’s actors in a gi-
ven policy field as well. Here, historians and political scientists should join forces, 
either to elucidate the status quo for today’s actors or to help anchor innovation in 
well-designed processes of gradual change. Academically, policy studies prefer holistic 
studies of an entire policy field and its players over biographies of individual persons or 
institutions. Unless, of course, such a well-funded government institution or civil soci-
ety organisation is about to celebrate its centennial (as many will in the upcoming 
years) …  
In sum, let us reflect on the three gaps. The methodological gap between history and 
political science is real, but it should not be abused as a cordon sanitaire. There are les-
sons to be learned both ways. And the comparative gap: Only bold comparisons over 
temporal, ideological and national borders have genuine exploratory potential. In case-
based comparisons, differences tend to stand out more than patterns. Therefore, I hope 
these examples have offered “variable-based” comparisons as a viable alternative, in 
particular in combination with the historian’s asset of historiography. And, as a dedi-
cated historian of both the European Union and the Balkans, I myself do mind the te-
nacity of the third gap: An agenda of European integration ought to include the inte-
gration of East European cases to enrich the tableau for transnational comparative 
research.
Let me conclude with one word of caution for political scientists, for those of you who 
have been persuaded by my talk and are eager now to begin collaborative projects with 
political historians. Absenteeism will be a problem. At some point, in the implementa-
tion phase of your project the historian will either look dreamily out the window (a.k.a., 
mild absenteeism) or not show up altogether. Because of the compartmentalised na-
ture of the interdisciplinary project and the rigid theoretical frameworks, he longs for 
a monograph and the solitude of an individual study: immersing himself in long-for-
gotten archives, re-reading patinaed historical studies in various languages and from 
different contexts. He also craves the guilty pleasure of committing his results to paper 
in a carefully crafted narrative, complete with original metaphors and craftily chosen 
portrayals. No regression analysis for sure, no impact factors, no explicit hypotheses or 
fixed criteria either – just the way it should be for a historian. Thank you.      
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